MPEP 2163.03(V) states "An original claim may lack written description support when ... (2) a broad genus claim is presented but the disclosure only describes a narrow species with no evidence that the genus is contemplated. See Ariad Pharms., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1349-50 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (en banc)." Here, the use of the singular in "a narrow species" could suggest that this rejection is only allowed... more »
MPEP § 2112 which address the Inherency Doctrine, makes clear that once a prima facie case of obviousness is established, the burden shifts to applicants to show that the claimed property is not inherent. However, this section of the MPEP (and the MPEP as a whole) fails to articulate how applicants can satisfy this burden. Because of this lack of guidance, Examiners commonly mistakenly apply the unexpected results standard... more »
The title is "ONCE A REFERENCE TEACHING PRODUCT APPEARING TO BE SUBSTANTIALLY IDENTICAL IS MADE THE BASIS OF A REJECTION, AND THE EXAMINER PRESENTS EVIDENCE OR REASONING TENDING TO SHOW INHERENCY, THE BURDEN SHIFTS TO THE APPLICANT TO SHOW AN UNOBVIOUS DIFFERENCE." This title is misleading because the rejection can also be overcome by rebutting the Examiner's evidence or logic for inherency. See Ex parte Levy, 17 USPQ2d... more »
Examiners often reference the decision of In re Schreiber, 1218 F.3d 1473 (Fed. Cir. 1997) for the proposition that “claims directed to an apparatus must be distinguished from the prior art in terms of structure rather than function” because it is described this way in MPEP §2114(I). However, it appears that the Schreiber court itself never made such a statement. Rather, the court found that because the claimed invention... more »
MPEP 2145, IV (Nov. 2015), at 2100-194, quotes In re Keller without explanation. The Office should expand the discussion to explain to Examiners and Applicants the scope of applicability of Keller. Keller says "[o]ne cannot show nonobviousness by attacking references individually where the rejections are based on combinations of references." 642 F.2d 413, 426. I have seen this quote interpreted to mean that any argument... more »
MPEP § 2172.01 is routinely misapplied by examiners. Examiners appear to apply it in situations where the examiner thinks that what the applicant is claiming is too broad, but: (i) the factual circumstances of the two main cited cases, In re Mayhew and In re Venezia, were quite narrow and never considered by the examiners; and (ii) most rejections under § 2172.01 directly contravene § 2173.04 (breadth is not indefiniteness).... more »
I believe that MPEP § 2164.04 is internally inconsistent, not an accurate statement of the law, and confusing. Examiners routinely cite MPEP § 2164.04 for the proposition that they do not have to provide any actual reasoning when rejecting a claim under § 112(a) as lacking enablement. This is not an accurate statement of the law; therefore, I suggest deleting this section. Alternatively, this section could be amended... more »
MPEP 2181 is very long and difficult to cite. At the very least, each roman numeral section should be converted into a constituent decimal section. For example: 2181 Identifying and Interpreting a 35 U.S.C. 112(f) or Pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 112, Sixth Paragraph Limitation 2181.01 DETERMINING WHETHER A CLAIM LIMITATION INVOKES 35 U.S.C. 112(f) or PRE-AIA 35 U.S.C. 112, SIXTH PARAGRAPH 2181.02 DESCRIPTION NECESSARY TO SUPPORT... more »
Why is the following quote from KSR included in this section about analogous art?: “Under the correct analysis, any need or problem known in the field of endeavor at the time of the invention and addressed by the patent [or application at issue] can provide a reason for combining the elements in the manner claimed. ” KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 420, 82 USPQ2d 1385, 1397 (2007). The 'problem' being... more »
I believe this section could be improved if there were more subheading designations within the section. For example under section A (Relevant Considerations for Evaluating Whether Additional Elements Amount to An Inventive Concept) there are two separate lists (Limitations that the courts have found to qualify as "significantly more" and Limitations that the courts have found not be enough to qualify as "significantly... more »
At multiple instances throughout MPEP 2141 thru 2145, the case "In re Lintner" is misspelled as "In re Linter".
One of the sentences in this paragraph is very unclear and is leading to confusion as to what the standard for the written description and in particular possession actually is. Quoting from MPEP 2161.01 I paragraph 6 the sentence in question is the first sentence from the following two sentences: Specifically, if one skilled in the art would know how to program the disclosed computer to perform the necessary steps described... more »
The first sentence in the second paragraph of MPEP § 2111.05(III.) reads: "However, where the claim as a whole is directed conveying a message or meaning to a human reader independent of the intended computer system, and/or the computer-readable medium merely serves as a support for information or data, no functional relationship exists." The phrase "is directed conveying" is missing the word "to," as in, "the claim... more »
Two paragraphs above 2181(II)(C) is the phrase "the claim should be rejected under 35 U.S.C. 112(f) or pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 112, second paragraph." I believe that the 'f' in 112(f) should be a 'b'.
p. 2100-164, first sentence: I believe "If proposed modification" should read "If a proposed modification."
p. 2100-165, around line 16: I believe "if the prior art device was turned upside down" should be "if the prior art device were turned upside down". See Gordon, cited, at 902.