MPEP § 2172.01 is routinely misapplied by examiners. Examiners appear to apply it in situations where the examiner thinks that what the applicant is claiming is too broad, but: (i) the factual circumstances of the two main cited cases, In re Mayhew and In re Venezia, were quite narrow and never considered by the examiners; and (ii) most rejections under § 2172.01 directly contravene § 2173.04 (breadth is not indefiniteness). ...more »
The title is "ONCE A REFERENCE TEACHING PRODUCT APPEARING TO BE SUBSTANTIALLY IDENTICAL IS MADE THE BASIS OF A REJECTION, AND THE EXAMINER PRESENTS EVIDENCE OR REASONING TENDING TO SHOW INHERENCY, THE BURDEN SHIFTS TO THE APPLICANT TO SHOW AN UNOBVIOUS DIFFERENCE." This title is misleading because the rejection can also be overcome by rebutting the Examiner's evidence or logic for inherency. See Ex parte Levy, 17 USPQ2d ...more »
Examiners often reference the decision of In re Schreiber, 1218 F.3d 1473 (Fed. Cir. 1997) for the proposition that “claims directed to an apparatus must be distinguished from the prior art in terms of structure rather than function” because it is described this way in MPEP §2114(I). However, it appears that the Schreiber court itself never made such a statement. Rather, the court found that because the claimed invention ...more »
MPEP 2145, IV (Nov. 2015), at 2100-194, quotes In re Keller without explanation. The Office should expand the discussion to explain to Examiners and Applicants the scope of applicability of Keller. Keller says "[o]ne cannot show nonobviousness by attacking references individually where the rejections are based on combinations of references." 642 F.2d 413, 426. I have seen this quote interpreted to mean that any argument ...more »
I believe that MPEP § 2164.04 is internally inconsistent, not an accurate statement of the law, and confusing. Examiners routinely cite MPEP § 2164.04 for the proposition that they do not have to provide any actual reasoning when rejecting a claim under § 112(a) as lacking enablement. This is not an accurate statement of the law; therefore, I suggest deleting this section. Alternatively, this section could be amended ...more »
MPEP 2181 is very long and difficult to cite. At the very least, each roman numeral section should be converted into a constituent decimal section. For example: 2181 Identifying and Interpreting a 35 U.S.C. 112(f) or Pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 112, Sixth Paragraph Limitation 2181.01 DETERMINING WHETHER A CLAIM LIMITATION INVOKES 35 U.S.C. 112(f) or PRE-AIA 35 U.S.C. 112, SIXTH PARAGRAPH 2181.02 DESCRIPTION NECESSARY TO SUPPORT ...more »
At multiple instances throughout MPEP 2141 thru 2145, the case "In re Lintner" is misspelled as "In re Linter".
One of the sentences in this paragraph is very unclear and is leading to confusion as to what the standard for the written description and in particular possession actually is. Quoting from MPEP 2161.01 I paragraph 6 the sentence in question is the first sentence from the following two sentences: Specifically, if one skilled in the art would know how to program the disclosed computer to perform the necessary steps described ...more »
The first sentence in the second paragraph of MPEP § 2111.05(III.) reads: "However, where the claim as a whole is directed conveying a message or meaning to a human reader independent of the intended computer system, and/or the computer-readable medium merely serves as a support for information or data, no functional relationship exists." The phrase "is directed conveying" is missing the word "to," as in, "the claim ...more »
p. 2100-164, first sentence: I believe "If proposed modification" should read "If a proposed modification."
p. 2100-165, around line 16: I believe "if the prior art device was turned upside down" should be "if the prior art device were turned upside down". See Gordon, cited, at 902.
It appears, in my experience, that there is confusion regarding this section of the MPEP and it would be very helpful to examiners if the MPEP would provide a more extensive discussion of preambles, intended uses and when statements in preambles actually limit the claimed Invention. Quite respectfully, the statement in the MPEP, upon citing In re Schriber, indicates 'If a prior art structure is capable of performing ...more »
As a suggestion, in relation to Minton v. Nat’l Ass’n of Securities Dealers, Inc, this section could be expanded, if deemed applicable, to include other words with a similar meaning to 'wherein' and 'whereby' which may also be interpreted as merely indicating the intended outcome of a positively-recited method step; e.g., 'thereby,' thereto,' 'therein.' It would also be very helpful, especially for new examiners, to ...more »