706.07(a) discusses the fact that an action cannot be made final if a new ground of rejection is not necessitated by amendment and/or Applicant's IDS. However, it provides no information pertaining to what actually constitutes a new ground of rejection. The MPEP Appeal section; however, 1207.03(a), provides substantive guidance on what constitutes a 'new rejection' in an Examiner's Answer which appears also to be applicable... more »
The URLs for the http://mpep.uspto.gov site are not currently friendly and it can be difficult to determine what a link might lead you to. The link for MPEP 1200 is currently: http://mpep.uspto.gov/RDMS/detail/manual/MPEP/current/d0e18.xml#/manual/MPEP/DC1_FPindexR-07.2015/d0e122292.xml It would be helpful if it were something more like this: http://mpep.uspto.gov/e9r072015/MPEP/1200 The link for 35 USC 101 is currently:... more »
MPEP Sec. 602.01(c)(1) cites the wrong version of CFR 1.48. Specifically, it cites the pre-aia version and not the latest version.
A decision was rendered in 1954 pertaining to indicia. In re Montgomery states: Patentable novelty cannot be principally predicated on mere printed matter and arrangements thereof, but must reside basically in physical structure. In re Montgomery, 102 USPQ 248 (CCPA 1954). Although this decision is old, it is pertinent in today's world, whether in displays where an application is trying to patent the word "caution" over... more »
Wow - first idea in this chapter!
Anyway, 402.10 (Nov. 2015) (p. 400-19, right column), first paragraph, says "Papers revoking ... will not be accepted ... when signed by less than all". I believe that should read "by fewer than all." Similarly, the title should "fewer" instead of "less." Thanks!
MPEP 818.02(a) says that in making a determination of whether election by original presentation has occurred, the present claimed should be compared to the "original claims." But this section directs the examiner to 821.03, which in turn cites 37 CFR 1.145, both of which say "previously claimed" instead of "original claims." A distinction can arise because application may have more than one set of amendments (i.e.,... more »
MPEP 2163.03(V) states "An original claim may lack written description support when ... (2) a broad genus claim is presented but the disclosure only describes a narrow species with no evidence that the genus is contemplated. See Ariad Pharms., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1349-50 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (en banc)." Here, the use of the singular in "a narrow species" could suggest that this rejection is only allowed... more »
MPEP 608.01(n)(III) is labeled "infringement test," but the "infringement test" is actually described in the previous section, MPEP 608.01(n)(II), third paragraph, discussing whether or not claims could be met without infringing the parent claims. In contrast, MPEP 608.01(n)(III) references infringement in its first paragraph, but then only discusses the "further limitation" requirement.
MPEP § 2112 which address the Inherency Doctrine, makes clear that once a prima facie case of obviousness is established, the burden shifts to applicants to show that the claimed property is not inherent. However, this section of the MPEP (and the MPEP as a whole) fails to articulate how applicants can satisfy this burden. Because of this lack of guidance, Examiners commonly mistakenly apply the unexpected results standard... more »
The previous rules provided an alternative method for correcting errors in provisional applications. Specifically, in § 201.03 section VI the 8th edition (Rev. 9 2012) the MPEP instructed that filing a non-provisional application with inventor overlap would correct any errors as to inventorship in a provisional application. This language, however, is absent in the present edition even though it is based on the same law... more »
As far as I understand, right now no claim is required to establish a filing date. But search around "at least one claim" on chapter 600, you still get a few such old descriptions.
The title is "ONCE A REFERENCE TEACHING PRODUCT APPEARING TO BE SUBSTANTIALLY IDENTICAL IS MADE THE BASIS OF A REJECTION, AND THE EXAMINER PRESENTS EVIDENCE OR REASONING TENDING TO SHOW INHERENCY, THE BURDEN SHIFTS TO THE APPLICANT TO SHOW AN UNOBVIOUS DIFFERENCE." This title is misleading because the rejection can also be overcome by rebutting the Examiner's evidence or logic for inherency. See Ex parte Levy, 17 USPQ2d... more »
Examiners often reference the decision of In re Schreiber, 1218 F.3d 1473 (Fed. Cir. 1997) for the proposition that “claims directed to an apparatus must be distinguished from the prior art in terms of structure rather than function” because it is described this way in MPEP §2114(I). However, it appears that the Schreiber court itself never made such a statement. Rather, the court found that because the claimed invention... more »
Section 1207.04 of the MPEP states that Examiners can reopen prosecution after the Applicant has filed an Appeal Brief. I do not see any basis in the patent statutes or rules for this section of the MPEP. Nor is there any justifiably reason to allow this. Examiners are allowed to place new rejections in the Examiner's Answer, which the Applicant can then choose to respond to by reopening prosecution or proceeding... more »
MPEP 2145, IV (Nov. 2015), at 2100-194, quotes In re Keller without explanation. The Office should expand the discussion to explain to Examiners and Applicants the scope of applicability of Keller. Keller says "[o]ne cannot show nonobviousness by attacking references individually where the rejections are based on combinations of references." 642 F.2d 413, 426. I have seen this quote interpreted to mean that any argument... more »