Discuss the Manual of Patent Examining Procedures (MPEP) Search Ideas

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Should §103 of the MPEP be completed with a lead-in section recommending examiners and applicants to frame their analysis on obviousness using the “problem-and-solution approach”?

See the article in ipWatchdog “Could or should the USPTO adopt the EPO problem-and-solution approach for assessing obviousness”.

In 1893.03(e), I.:

The text notes that "If the international application is published in English, the Office will use the description, claims, abstract and drawings as published in the pamphlet for the U.S. national stage application under 35 U.S.C. 371." This statement is perfectly clear. However, I think it would benefit from some expansion.

1. I proposed expressly adding the logical consequence: "Therefore, any... more »

I think 1893 (Nov. 2015) and its subsections could improve clarity on the national-stage status of amendments other than those made during Chapter II. Currently:

- 1893.01(d) mentions that a translation in the national stage should incorporate any Rule 26 corrections or Rule 91 rectifications.

- 1893.03(e), I. references the WIPO pamphlet of the application, but does not specify the effect of any republications.... more »

Can theatrical films or movies like "Back to the Future" be cited as art in an IDS? I am familiar with citing Youtube videos. Would it be necessary to paper file the IDS and include a DVD of the movie?

The current text of MPEP 2111.05, if read quickly, seems to suggest that a "function" of "descriptive material" itself carries patentable weight. But this interpretation is not correct: A sheet of instructions as part of the kit claim in In re Ngai (cited in this section) was found to *not* have patentable weight. The "functional" nature of the particular instructions did not save the claims from anticipation over a... more »

It appears, in my experience, that there is confusion regarding this section of the MPEP and it would be very helpful to examiners if the MPEP would provide a more extensive discussion of preambles, intended uses and when statements in preambles actually limit the claimed Invention. Quite respectfully, the statement in the MPEP, upon citing In re Schriber, indicates 'If a prior art structure is capable of performing... more »

As a suggestion, in relation to Minton v. Nat’l Ass’n of Securities Dealers, Inc, this section could be expanded, if deemed applicable, to include other words with a similar meaning to 'wherein' and 'whereby' which may also be interpreted as merely indicating the intended outcome of a positively-recited method step; e.g., 'thereby,' thereto,' 'therein.' It would also be very helpful, especially for new examiners, to... more »

The MPEP here states:

When a compound or composition claim is limited by a particular use, enablement of that claim should be evaluated based on that limitation.
See In re Vaeck, 947 F.2d 488, 495, 20 USPQ2d 1438, 1444 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (claiming a chimeric gene capable of being expressed in any
cyanobacterium and thus defining the claimed gene by its use).

Quite respectfully, is it 'defining the claimed gene by... more »

The title is "ONCE A REFERENCE TEACHING PRODUCT APPEARING TO BE SUBSTANTIALLY IDENTICAL IS MADE THE BASIS OF A REJECTION, AND THE EXAMINER PRESENTS EVIDENCE OR REASONING TENDING TO SHOW INHERENCY, THE BURDEN SHIFTS TO THE APPLICANT TO SHOW AN UNOBVIOUS DIFFERENCE."

This title is misleading because the rejection can also be overcome by rebutting the Examiner's evidence or logic for inherency. See Ex parte Levy, 17 USPQ2d... more »

At multiple instances throughout MPEP 2141 thru 2145, the case "In re Lintner" is misspelled as "In re Linter".

Examiners often reference the decision of In re Schreiber, 1218 F.3d 1473 (Fed. Cir. 1997) for the proposition that “claims directed to an apparatus must be distinguished from the prior art in terms of structure rather than function” because it is described this way in MPEP §2114(I). However, it appears that the Schreiber court itself never made such a statement. Rather, the court found that because the claimed invention... more »

MPEP 2145, IV (Nov. 2015), at 2100-194, quotes In re Keller without explanation. The Office should expand the discussion to explain to Examiners and Applicants the scope of applicability of Keller.

Keller says "[o]ne cannot show nonobviousness by attacking references individually where the rejections are based on combinations of references." 642 F.2d 413, 426. I have seen this quote interpreted to mean that any argument... more »

MPEP § 2172.01 is routinely misapplied by examiners. Examiners appear to apply it in situations where the examiner thinks that what the applicant is claiming is too broad, but:
(i) the factual circumstances of the two main cited cases, In re Mayhew and In re Venezia, were quite narrow and never considered by the examiners; and
(ii) most rejections under § 2172.01 directly contravene § 2173.04 (breadth is not indefiniteness).... more »

I believe that MPEP § 2164.04 is internally inconsistent, not an accurate statement of the law, and confusing. Examiners routinely cite MPEP § 2164.04 for the proposition that they do not have to provide any actual reasoning when rejecting a claim under § 112(a) as lacking enablement. This is not an accurate statement of the law; therefore, I suggest deleting this section. Alternatively, this section could be amended... more »