Examiners often reference the decision of In re Schreiber, 1218 F.3d 1473 (Fed. Cir. 1997) for the proposition that “claims directed to an apparatus must be distinguished from the prior art in terms of structure rather than function” because it is described this way in MPEP §2114(I). However, it appears that the Schreiber court itself never made such a statement. Rather, the court found that because the claimed invention... more »
706.07(a) discusses the fact that an action cannot be made final if a new ground of rejection is not necessitated by amendment and/or Applicant's IDS. However, it provides no information pertaining to what actually constitutes a new ground of rejection. The MPEP Appeal section; however, 1207.03(a), provides substantive guidance on what constitutes a 'new rejection' in an Examiner's Answer which appears also to be applicable... more »
A decision was rendered in 1954 pertaining to indicia. In re Montgomery states: Patentable novelty cannot be principally predicated on mere printed matter and arrangements thereof, but must reside basically in physical structure. In re Montgomery, 102 USPQ 248 (CCPA 1954). Although this decision is old, it is pertinent in today's world, whether in displays where an application is trying to patent the word "caution" over... more »
MPEP Sec. 602.01(c)(1) cites the wrong version of CFR 1.48. Specifically, it cites the pre-aia version and not the latest version.
Why is the following quote from KSR included in this section about analogous art?: “Under the correct analysis, any need or problem known in the field of endeavor at the time of the invention and addressed by the patent [or application at issue] can provide a reason for combining the elements in the manner claimed. ” KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 420, 82 USPQ2d 1385, 1397 (2007). The 'problem' being... more »
It appears, in my experience, that there is confusion regarding this section of the MPEP and it would be very helpful to examiners if the MPEP would provide a more extensive discussion of preambles, intended uses and when statements in preambles actually limit the claimed Invention. Quite respectfully, the statement in the MPEP, upon citing In re Schriber, indicates 'If a prior art structure is capable of performing... more »
MPEP § 2112 which address the Inherency Doctrine, makes clear that once a prima facie case of obviousness is established, the burden shifts to applicants to show that the claimed property is not inherent. However, this section of the MPEP (and the MPEP as a whole) fails to articulate how applicants can satisfy this burden. Because of this lack of guidance, Examiners commonly mistakenly apply the unexpected results standard... more »
The URLs for the http://mpep.uspto.gov site are not currently friendly and it can be difficult to determine what a link might lead you to. The link for MPEP 1200 is currently: http://mpep.uspto.gov/RDMS/detail/manual/MPEP/current/d0e18.xml#/manual/MPEP/DC1_FPindexR-07.2015/d0e122292.xml It would be helpful if it were something more like this: http://mpep.uspto.gov/e9r072015/MPEP/1200 The link for 35 USC 101 is currently:... more »
MPEP § 2111.03 explains how different transitional phrases in a claim affect claim scope with respect to what "unrecited" additional components or steps, if any, are excluded from the scope of the claim. I proposed replacing all instances of the word "unrecited" with the word "non-recited." This word, "unrecited," does not accurately describe the concept. When the "un-" prefix is paired with a verb, it typically causes... more »
p. 2100-164, first sentence: I believe "If proposed modification" should read "If a proposed modification."
p. 2100-165, around line 16: I believe "if the prior art device was turned upside down" should be "if the prior art device were turned upside down". See Gordon, cited, at 902.
MPEP 2145, IV (Nov. 2015), at 2100-194, quotes In re Keller without explanation. The Office should expand the discussion to explain to Examiners and Applicants the scope of applicability of Keller. Keller says "[o]ne cannot show nonobviousness by attacking references individually where the rejections are based on combinations of references." 642 F.2d 413, 426. I have seen this quote interpreted to mean that any argument... more »
The previous rules provided an alternative method for correcting errors in provisional applications. Specifically, in § 201.03 section VI the 8th edition (Rev. 9 2012) the MPEP instructed that filing a non-provisional application with inventor overlap would correct any errors as to inventorship in a provisional application. This language, however, is absent in the present edition even though it is based on the same law... more »
MPEP 2163.03(V) states "An original claim may lack written description support when ... (2) a broad genus claim is presented but the disclosure only describes a narrow species with no evidence that the genus is contemplated. See Ariad Pharms., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1349-50 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (en banc)." Here, the use of the singular in "a narrow species" could suggest that this rejection is only allowed... more »
In the PDF files, Subject Matter Index, Nov. 2015 (mpep-9090-subject-matter-index.pdf), the Bookmarks do not include the expandable "MPEP TOC" to provide direct access to other MPEP sections. Would you please add them? Thanks!
Should §103 of the MPEP be completed with a lead-in section recommending examiners and applicants to frame their analysis on obviousness using the “problem-and-solution approach”?
See the article in ipWatchdog “Could or should the USPTO adopt the EPO problem-and-solution approach for assessing obviousness”.